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This paper studies the effects from poor school building conditions on student achievements 
in Norwegian primary schools based on results from national tests in mathematics, English 
and Norwegian. The benchmark OLS results suggest a negative relationship, but the estimates 
are mostly insignificant. Further, a municipality fixed effects (MFE) and an instrumental 
variable approach (IV) is suggested as alternatives to OLS in order to battle potential 
endogeneity issues due to unobservable characteristics. The results from the OLS and IV-
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1.  Introduction 
 
As in many other countries, the condition of school buildings has been a heavily discussed 
topic in the public debate in Norway. The present paper is inspired by this debate and aims to 
investigate to which extent the condition of school buildings affects student achievements in 
Norwegian primary schools. Some studies suggest that improving environmental conditions 
may gain student achievements by reducing distractions and missed school days (literature 
reviewed by Earthman (2002) and Mendell and Heath (2005)). This may also benefit teachers 
by improving their morale and reducing absenteeism and turnover, indirectly affecting student 
achievements (Buckley et al., 2005). However, even though this paper settles into a large 
economist literature studying the effects from educational expenditures
1, this specific question 
has been granted little attention within this literature.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, Hopland (2011) is the only study, apart from the present, that 
uses an educational production function approach to investigate potential effects from school 
building conditions on student achievements. That study focuses on the effects from poor 
school facilities in eight countries using data from the TIMSS 2003 database. The empirical 
strategy is to estimate how the condition of school facilities affects the school contribution to 
test scores, using OLS and matching on propensity score to control for observable 
characteristics. The findings suggest that there is a negative relationship between poor school 
facilities and student achievements in some of the countries, but that the link is mostly 
insignificant. Importantly it is, due to scarcity of data, not possible to control for any 
unobservable characteristics that may be correlated with both test scores and building 
conditions when studying the TIMSS data. Thus the discussion is restricted to one of possible 
associations rather than robustly identified causal effects.  
 
                                                 
1 The debate between Hanushek and Card and Krueger on the effects of resources gives a good overview of the 
debate in the general school spending literature. Hanushek (1996) reviews more than 90 studies and concludes 
that simply increasing resources leaves little hope for improved student achievements. However, Hanushek’s 
interpretation of the literature is disputed by Card & Krueger (1996). In recent years, the debate on class size has 
been central in the school resource debate (e.g. Krueger (1999), Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Leuven et al. 
(2008)).   3
Another recent and highly relevant study is Cellini et al. (2010). They study effects from 
investments in school facilities on housing prices and student achievements in Californian 
school districts, using a regression discontinuity design to obtain exogenous variation in the 
investments. Thus they study broad effects that include but are not restricted to student 
achievements. Interestingly, the long-run effects on student achievements are far from strong 
enough to explain the effect they identify on housing prices, and they find no effects in the 
short run. Furthermore, their estimates are imprecise and their evidence in favor of long-run 
effects is not unambiguous. Thus they conclude that there is, at best, weak evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that increased investments in school facilities will boost student 
achievements even in the long run. An interesting implication of their findings is that the 
value of investments in school facilities is not restricted to improvement of scholastic 
achievements.  
 
Even though their results regarding the long-run effects on student achievements are not 
unambiguous, it will be reasonable to expect that the effects from physical work conditions 
(and investments in such) will be stronger in the long run than in the short run. It is unlikely 
that performances will have a sudden boost when school facilities are improved, since a 
student’s performances in earlier years obviously will affect his performances in the years 
ahead. Thus it will take some time before effects from the improved facilities are observed. 
We should also keep in mind that those students who are enrolled after the investment period 
will only have been exposed to the good facilities. If school facilities matter, these new 
students should then, all other things equal, perform better than students in earlier cohorts. 
Thus, the finding that effects from investment in school buildings on student achievements (if 
any at all) are stronger in the long run than in the short run should not come as a major 
surprise.  
 
Interestingly, the studies by Hopland and Cellini et al. reach similar conclusions even though 
they differ substantially both with respect to research questions and empirical strategies. 
However, there is still need for more research on this topic since Hopland’s study is suffering 
from uncertain identification and Cellini et al., are not studying effects from building 
conditions directly. In this paper I aim to study the effects from school building conditions on 
5
th grade students in Norwegian primary schools.
2 Most 5
th grade students in the highly rigid 
                                                 
2 5
th grade is the third last year in Norwegian primary school.   4
Norwegian school system have spent all their years of schooling within the same school, 
giving the building conditions time to affect their achievements. I will use unique survey data 
for building conditions, combined with test scores from national tests in mathematics, 
Norwegian and English and register data. In addition, I will include school and municipality 
specific control variables in the regressions.  
 
Similar to the study by Hopland, this paper investigates direct effects of building conditions 
rather than investments in such. Investments will obviously be correlated with building 
conditions, but far from perfectly, since the daily maintenance expenditures will also be an 
important determinant for the condition of facilities. Thus, where investments in school 
facilities may serve as a proxy for the quality of the school facilities, this paper studies the 
effects from a direct measure. I will combine OLS with and without municipality fixed effects 
and an instrumental variable approach in order to obtain unbiased effects of school building 
conditions on student achievements.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and some 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical strategies. OLS regressions act as the 
benchmarks while municipality fixed effects (MFE) and an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach is presented as alternatives in order to battle possible endogeneity due to 
unobservable characteristics. The results are presented in Section 4, before some concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 5. 
 
2.  A first look at the data 
 
The key explanatory variable is from a survey on public school buildings performed by The 
Auditor General of Norway (Riksrevisjonen). A questionnaire was mailed to the department 
responsible for school buildings in 129 local governments. All large local governments 
(population size above 20,000) were included. For the rest a stratified random sample was 
drawn, with stratification based on population size and local government revenue. The 
response rate was as high as 85 percent and in total I have building condition data for 464 
schools in 107 Norwegian municipalities.  
 
The school building condition data are from a rather small sample of the Norwegian 
municipalities (107 of 430). However, the selection process conducted by The Auditor   5
General should guarantee a fairly representative sample, except for the skew towards more 
populous municipalities mentioned above. This skew in the sample should, however, not be of 
such magnitude that it makes generalization problematic. Each of the local governments was 
instructed to report between one and ten school buildings built prior to 1985.
 3 New schools 
were excluded from the survey because the aim was to study whether maintenance was 
sufficient over time. Municipalities with more than ten schools were instructed to pick schools 
in alphabetical order. This was in order to avoid selection based on building condition, or any 
other potential grounds for selection.  
 
The Auditor General survey dates from 2004. Thus, the school building conditions can be 
interpreted as the conditions the 5
th grade students taking the test in 2009 faced when arriving 
on their first day at school (they started in 1
st grade in fall 2005). Further, building conditions 
in general develop quite sluggishly and it will be fair to assume that a large majority of the 
students have not switched schools during their four years of completed schooling prior to the 
tests. Hence, most students have been exposed to the same school building conditions 
throughout their ‘career’ in primary school.  
 
The building conditions are reported using a highly standardized four step scale, which is 
widely used in classification of building conditions in Norway.
4 Zero indicates a building in 
very good condition, in practice new buildings, while three indicates a building in severely 
deteriorated condition. In the econometric specification I will use two different formulations 
based on this index. Firstly, I will apply a flexible formulation where I include dummies for 
each of the categories, using the best buildings as reference category. Secondly, I will 
introduce a poor buildings dummy (pbuild) which equals one if the school is reported to be in 
category 2 or 3. Buildings in categories zero or one are in general considered to be in good 
condition, giving this dummy variable presentation an intuitive interpretation. We then simply 
compare all school buildings which are not in optimal condition to those reported to be more 
                                                 
3 Among the schools that were reported are also lower secondary schools, which are also owned and operated by 
the local government. These are excluded from the analysis because the national tests in lower secondary school 
are performed in the first year (8
th grade). Hence, an analysis of their test scores will to a large extent capture 
potential effects from the condition of the buildings in their primary school (which I cannot identify) rather than 
their present school. Thus, all 464 schools in the sample are either primary schools (1.-7. grade) or combined 
schools (1.-10. grade). 
4 Norwegian Standard 3424 building Condition Analysis (NS3424 BCA).   6
or less flawless, asking: Do children in poor school buildings have lower test scores than 
those in good school buildings?  
 
Table 1 summarizes the different categories of the building condition index and presents 
descriptive statistics for the poor buildings dummy. We observe that buildings in category 2 
are the most often observed, with 42 percent of the students. These buildings are considered to 
be in an unsatisfying condition with some need for upgrading, but the flaws are not 
necessarily considered as critical. The second most observed category is category 1, which 
indicates that the building has some signs of wear and tear, but is in good working condition. 
The important cut-off for this study will be between these two categories. This is because 
whereas category 1 buildings are considered to be in a satisfying condition, category 2 
buildings are considered as being in an unsatisfying condition. 
  
The share of students in flawless buildings (category 0) is somewhat higher than the share of 
students enrolled in schools with buildings in the worst category (category 3), but the shares 
are quite low for both categories. This indicates that a low share of the students attend schools 
that have buildings that are either totally flawless or in a severely deteriorated condition and 
that much of the distinction between good and poor school buildings will be based on the 
mid-categories. Finally we note that 53 percent of the students attend schools in category two 
or three. This gives that the poor buildings dummy has an average value of 0.53. When using 
this dummy in the analysis, we thus have a treatment group (students in poor school 
buildings) which is roughly the same size as the control group (students in good school 
buildings).  
 
Table 1 About here 
 
The remaining data is generated through that the Norwegian Directorate for Education and 
Training transferred the test results (with identification of the individual student) to Statistics 
Norway, which connected register data to the test results. Statistics Norway then anonymized 
the students and schools, but not the municipality in which the schools are located before 
making them available for research purposes. Since it is possible to identify the municipalities, 
I have also been able to connect more municipality specific control variables. Descriptive 
statistics for the control variables are given in Appendix Table A1 and they will be more 
closely discussed as they are introduced in the analysis. Summary statistics for the test scores   7
in the surveyed schools are presented in Table 2. We note from the descriptive statistics that 
the different tests have somewhat different scaling, a point one should keep in mind when 
interpreting the coefficients in the empirical study. The average scores are 54 percent, 62 
percent and 56 percent of the maximum value for the tests in mathematics, Norwegian and 
English respectively. 
 
Table 2 About here 
 
Finally, a brief discussion about the usefulness of the data from the Auditor General is 
required. There are two main concerns associated with these data. The first is a simple 
question of relevance due to the time gap between the survey and the tests. If many of the 
schools in my sample were subject to massive upgrading early in this period, my key 
explanatory variable will not be especially interesting at all. The second concern is related to 
sample selection bias, due to the fact that I in most cases only have a sample of the schools in 
a municipality rather than all. These concerns must be addressed properly before moving on 
to the empirical analysis. 
 
To check the relevance of the building condition data, I have contacted the local governments 
and asked whether any of the reported schools were subject to major upgrading between the 
survey (2004) and the tests (2009). As discussed in the introduction, it is likely that it will take 
some time from an investment in improved building conditions until student achievements are 
improved. Hence, it will only be problematic if major renovation projects have been 
performed fairly early in this period. Since I contacted the local governments after Statistics 
Norway had connected the school building conditions to the test score data base, I am 
unfortunately unable to remove those schools that have been upgraded from the sample. This 
is due to the anonymization of the schools implemented by Statistics Norway when 
connecting these data. However, the feedback from the local governments indicates that this is 
a problem for less than 10 percent of the schools in my sample. Thus this should not corrupt 
the results critically.  
 
Another potential flaw of the data is that I for a majority of the municipalities do not have the 
full population of schools. These 68 municipalities are in general more populous than those 
which have reported all schools, something which is clearly illustrated by the number of 
students in these municipalities. Of the roughly 13,500 students that are enrolled in the   8
surveyed schools, more than 11,000 are from one of these 68 municipalities. The selection 
process specified by the Auditor General should ensure that the municipalities do not perform 
strategic reporting. However one may still have that the reported schools differ from the non-
reported, since only schools built prior to 1985 has been reported. Thus, I need to investigate 
the possibility of a sample selection bias. To check for this I utilize the fact that even though I 
have building conditions for only a sample of the schools, my data set includes both test 
scores as well as all the control variables for the full population of schools. The test goes as 
follows: I have estimated test scores using a municipality fixed effects model using the 68 
municipalities from which I have building conditions for only a sample of the schools, 
including also the schools for which I do not have building condition data. The model 
includes a dummy that equals one if the school was not reported to the survey and the 
variables that are most likely to be associated with sorting.  
 
Any significant estimates for the dummy indicating that the school was not reported will then 
indicate that I have sample selection issues that are not captured by the observable control 
variables. This will then make generalization of the results difficult, since a positive 
(negative) estimate for the dummy variable would imply that my sample has an overweight of 
poorer (better) performing students. However, the results from Table 3 indicate that this is not 
a problem, since the dummy does not have a significant impact on any of the three test scores 
and the sign of the coefficient is not even consistent. Hence, it seems safe to assume that the 
reported schools are representative for their respective municipalities (conditioned on 




Table 3 About here 
 
3. Empirical strategies 
 
                                                 
5 Appendix Table A2 presents a different test. There I place the dummy indicating that the school has not been 
reported on the left hand side and estimate a linear probability model with municipality fixed effects. The idea 
then is to test whether the probability that the school was not reported is dependent upon observable 
characteristics. With two exceptions, all the included ‘sorting variables’ come out as insignificant. We only 
observe some fairly small effects from school size and the educational level of the students’ mothers. Thus, also 
this test indicates that the analysis will not be plagued by a sample selection bias.   9
I start out by estimating a standard educational production function using OLS  
 
   0 Condition jm jm ijm ijm x jm m ijm yu        x                               (1) 
 
where  ijm y  is the test score for student i in school j located in municipality m.  jm   captures 
the effect from the included measure(s) of building condition. ijm x  is a vector of individual and 
family characteristics,  jm    is a vector of school specific controls and  m    is a vector of 
variables describing the municipality. The OLS estimates may still be suffering from bias due 
to omitted variables, even when controlling for the full set of observable characteristics. 
However, it is not given in which direction OLS will be biased, as illustrated by the following 
examples. 
 
It is unlikely that all characteristics of a good teacher are observable in the data. Thus, if good 
teachers have a positive effect on student achievements and sort themselves into schools with 
good buildings, OLS will tend to overestimate negative effects from poor building conditions. 
A similar effect will occur if resourceful parents sort their children into schools with good 
building conditions, since it is unlikely that the controls capture all relevant characteristics of 
the family background and peer effects.
6 
 
Compensatory or regressive policies are other potential causes of bias. If policy makers 
believe that school building conditions are important for student achievements, this may lead 
them to upgrade school buildings where achievements are low. This will tend towards an 
underestimation of negative effects from poor school buildings when using OLS. Regressive 
policies could occur if politicians observe that voters in school districts with poor student 
achievements are less likely to vote and will tend to bias OLS in the opposite direction.  
 
As we see, there are good reasons to expect that the OLS analysis will be plagued by 
endogeneity due to unobservable characteristics. Furthermore we have seen that it is not clear 
in which direction the OLS estimates will be biased. The endogeneity problems may arise in 
                                                 
6 The Norwegian school district regulations are highly rigorous, in practice reducing the possibility for parents to 
affect the choice of public school to physically moving to another school district. The possibility to assign 
children to private schools is also very limited in Norway. Thus parental sorting between schools may not be a 
very serious issue when dealing with Norwegian data. However, I cannot completely rule it out.   10
two dimensions, between municipalities and between schools within a municipality. The first 
of these may be handled by including municipality fixed effects. All variables in the  m   
vector will then be placed in a municipality specific constant term, giving us equations of the 
form 
 
         Condition ijm m jm jm ijm x jm ijm y u          x                                          (2)   
 
where  m   captures the municipality fixed effects. This effectively rules out bias caused by 
omitted municipality specific variables. What then remains of the omitted variable problem is 
the possibility for sorting based on unobservable characteristics between schools within each 
municipality.  
 
Importantly, we will see in the next section that the data indicates that sorting across 
municipalities is not an important problem for this study. This is consistent with studies of 
teacher turnover in Norway which indicate that teachers are more likely to move between 
schools within the same municipality than to move across municipalities (see Bonesrønning et 
al. (2005) and Falch and Strøm (2005)). Similar geographical constraints will also apply for 
parents. Hence, it is also likely that parental sorting to a large extent will take place within 
municipalities. Thus, the main worry for the analysis will be related to sorting between 
schools within the municipalities. Such within municipality sorting based on school building 
conditions will bias both the OLS and MFE estimates if the control variables do not capture 
all relevant effects of teacher quality, individual characteristics and family background. To 
solve this I need to find an instrumental variable (IV) that removes the bias due to such 
sorting.  
 
Akerhielm (1995) and Wößmann and West (2006) use the average class size in the school and 
cohort respectively as instrument for actual class size, utilizing that this removes causality 
problems related to within school sorting.
7 Analogue to this, I use the average school building 
condition in the municipality as instrument for the individual school’s building condition to 
remove endogeneity due to within municipality sorting.  
 
                                                 
7 Wößmann and West utilize information about two cohorts in each school, allowing them to also control for 
school fixed effects. Akerhielm does not control for school fixed effects in her paper.   11
There are two requirements that must be fulfilled in order for an instrument to be valid. Firstly, 
it must be strongly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable. Secondly, it must not 
have any effects on the dependent variable apart from the indirect effect it has through the 
endogenous explanatory variable. The first requirement is obviously fulfilled; the average 
school building conditions are as observed from Table 4 strongly correlated with the poor 
buildings dummy. Further, it will also remove the problems related to sorting of teachers or 
students to the schools with the best building conditions within each municipality, since we 
utilize the average of the reported schools. Table 4 presents, in addition to the correlation 
between the instrument and the poor buildings dummy, descriptive statistics for the 
instrument. 
 
Table 4 About here 
 
Importantly, the average school building condition in a municipality will be exogenous to the 
individual student achievements. It is reasonable to assume that the average building 
condition only affects the students through that the condition of their school building is a part 
of the average. A further advantage by using the suggested IV approach is that the averages 
will be less sensitive to renovation projects on the individual school in the period 2005-2009. 
This will also reduce the potential measurement problems caused by the time-gap between the 
collection of data on school building conditions and the national testing.  
 
Note that in some of the municipalities there is only one school. In these municipalities we 
will have that the instrument is exactly identical to the endogenous explanatory variable. This 
should not be a problem for the instrument validity, since municipalities with only one school 
will not have any potential for sorting between schools within the municipality in the first 
place. 
 
The suggested instrument should ensure that endogeneity issues related to any form of within 
municipality sorting are resolved. However, one potential worry arises from that the average 
school building conditions may be correlated with other resource factors in the municipality 
which are also important for student achievements. Note that if there are any municipality 
specific factors that are related to both average school building conditions in the municipality 
and student achievements that I am unable to control for, this will invalidate the instrument. I   12
will thus have to return to the discussion regarding the instrument validity in the proceeding 




Table 5 About here 
 
Table 5 presents results from the OLS regressions where each of the three tests has been 
analyzed separately. In the regressions in the upper part, I have included dummies for each of 
the three least favorable categories, leaving the best buildings as reference. In the lower parts 
of the table I use the poor buildings dummy as the key explanatory variable. Columns (A)-(C) 
give results from simple regressions where the building condition is the only explanatory 
variable included, while control variables are gradually added in the remaining columns.  
 
From the three-dummy formulation we observe that the signs, with three exceptions, are 
negative, as expected. The positive estimates are all far from being significant at any 
conventional level of significance, and are thus to be considered as estimated zeroes. There 
are no significantly negative effects from the category 1 dummy, and all positive estimates are 
for this category. This is also expected, since buildings in this category are considered to be in 
good working condition. Notably, category 2 has consistently stronger negative estimated 
effects than the poorer category 3 even though the difference is not statistical significant. The 
slightly stronger observed effect from category 2 buildings may to some extent come from the 
relatively few schools in category 3 compared to category 2.  
 
The one-dummy specification with a separation between schools in good (category 0 and 
category 1) and poor (category 2 and category 3), is a simplification of the model which 
involves two restrictions. Firstly, I restrict the coefficient for the category one dummy to be 
equal to zero. Secondly, I restrict the coefficients for the categories 2 and 3 to be identical. 
Tests of the joint hypothesis indicate that this is a reasonable simplification of the model.
8 The 
                                                 














ur R  and 
2
r R  are the R-squared of the unrestricted and restricted specifications respectively, q is the number of 
restrictions imposed (2), and  1 nk   is the degrees of freedom in the unrestricted specification. The two R-  13
remainder of the study will focus on this specification because of its intuitively appealing 
interpretation.  
 
In the simple regressions I find a significantly negative coefficient on test scores in both 
mathematics and English from the poor buildings dummy. A coefficient value of -0.653 for 
mathematics indicate that students in poor school buildings are expected to score roughly 7 
percent of a standard deviation lower than those in good buildings. The estimated effect from 
the poor school buildings dummy on the English test scores is -0.701 which indicates that 
students in poor school buildings score roughly 9 percent of a test score standard deviation 
lower than students in good school buildings on the English reading test.  
 
In the columns (D)-(L) I gradually extend the model by including relevant explanatory 
variables. Firstly, I include characteristics about the student and his family in columns (E)-(F). 
These are the student’s gender and the parents’ income and educational level. In columns (G)-
(I) I extend the model with school specific controls. The teacher/student ratio is important 
since it is a measure of the general resource use in the school and may very well be correlated 
with resources spent on maintaining the building infrastructure. It is calculated as the number 
of teacher man years in the school divided by the number of students. Further I include the 
number of students, the share of teachers with a license to teach and a dummy indicating 
whether the school is a pure primary school (1.-7. grade) or a combined school (1.-10. grade). 
The dummy equals one if the school is a combined school.  
 
The variables describing the municipality are included in columns (J)-(L). These include the 
average gross income and the general educational level of the population which are given 
from the test score data bank provided by Statistics Norway. In addition to these I include a 
set of control variables that I have connected to the dataset myself. These are the local 
governments’ revenues and funds, population growth in the municipality, the share of 
socialists in the local council and a variable describing the level of political fragmentation in 
the local council. The additional municipality controls are similar to the variables used in 
Borge and Hopland’s (2011) investigation of determinants of building conditions in 
                                                                                                                                                          
squares are identical in most of the specifications and in these cases we simply obtain an F-value of 0. We can 
thus not reject the joint hypothesis that the coefficient for category 1 dummy is zero and that the coefficients for 
the categories 2 and 3 dummies are identical.   14
Norwegian local governments. As part of their study, they analyzed the same school building 
conditions as I use in the present paper. 
 
Interestingly the coefficients for the poor buildings dummy do not change dramatically when 
including the large set of control variables. However, when using the more general 
specifications we only observe significant effects from poor school buildings on the test 
scores in English. A coefficient value of -0.499 indicates a negative treatment effect of 
roughly 6 percent of a test score standard deviation in the most general specification. As 
discussed in Section 3, it will be useful to check whether the municipality specific controls 
used in the OLS analysis capture all relevant municipality specific effects. In Table 6 I 
therefore repeat the analysis, but now include municipality fixed effects in order to take into 
account all variation on the municipality level.  
 
Table 6 About here 
 
We observe that including municipality fixed effects in the regressions do not change the 
coefficients much, but that the significance is reduced so that none of the coefficients are 
significant at any conventional level of significance. However, the observation that the 
coefficients are stable is important, since it indicates that there does not seem to be any 
serious problems related to unobservable characteristics on the municipality level. This is 
consistent with the observation from Appendix Table A3 which reports estimations of the 
building conditions (a proxy of the first-stage regressions). From that we observe that the 
coefficient for the average building condition is not sensitive to inclusion of municipality 
specific controls when estimating the actual building condition. Even though these results 
cannot be considered as proof of the exogeneity of the instrument, they are certainly not 
inconsistent with it. 
 
Table 7 About here 
 
Table 7 reports the results from the second stage of the instrumental variable approach where 
county dummies are included in order to capture any unobservable geographical 
characteristics. We observe that the first stage-F is far above the rule of thumb of 10 
suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), indicating that the instrument is sufficiently correlated 
with the endogenous explanatory variable. We still observe that all the estimated coefficients   15
are negative, but that most of them are somewhat less precisely estimated than when using 
OLS. This is expected since introducing IV as an alternative to OLS means trading bias for 
precision.  
 
The estimated coefficients are quite similar to the ones obtained when using OLS and MFE 
when estimating test scores in mathematics and Norwegian. However, when estimating the 
test scores in English we observe a rather large increase in the absolute value of the 
coefficient for the poor buildings dummy. Furthermore, the estimation of the English test 
score in the most general model also provides the only significant coefficient for the poor 
buildings dummy. 
 
A coefficient value of -1.304 for the poor buildings dummy indicate that students in poor 
school buildings are expected to score roughly 16 percent of a standard deviation lower in 
English than those in good buildings. The somewhat stronger effect from poor school 
buildings on the test scores in English is also observed (though to a lesser extent) in the OLS 
and MFE estimations, and thus seems to be a robust finding. However, it is far from obvious 
why this is the case. 
 
One final worry must be addressed before concluding the paper. As discussed earlier, it may 
be problematic that I cannot control for municipality fixed effects when using this instrument. 
It is not given that fixing the effects at the county level will solve problems related to 
geographical fixed effects, due to the rather high aggregation level.
9 In order to test if the 
results are sensitive to the inclusion of geographical fixed effects a test of robustness is 
provided in the Appendix. Appendix Table A8 reports results from IV regressions with two 
alternative levels of geographical controls. The upper part of the table controls for less than 
the one reported in the main text, and includes no geographical dummies. The lower part of 
the Table reports results where labor market region dummies are included. This is a level 
between the municipality and the county and thus captures more geographical fixed effects 
than the benchmark. The latter should be interpreted with some caution since I end up with 
only one municipality in many of the regions, and thus loose a lot of variation, due to the low 
number of municipalities in the sample. The low variation especially gives that the standard 
errors are not very precisely calculated.  
                                                 
9 The 107 municipalities are spread over 18 counties.   16
 
We observe that the results are mostly not sensitive to which extent I choose to control for 
geographical fixed effects. All coefficients for the poor buildings dummy are quite similar to 
the benchmark estimation with county dummies when the regional dummies are used instead. 
This indicates that the county dummy specification captures the same unobserved 
geographical characteristics as the lower aggregation level. When estimating the model 
without any geographical dummies, we yet again observe that most of the results do not seem 
to be sensitive to fixed geographical effects. The only exception is the coefficient for the poor 
buildings dummy when estimating the English test scores in the most general model. This is 
reduced quite heavily when no geographical fixed effects are taken into account.  
 
To sum up the results from the empirical approaches, we observe that the findings do not 
differ heavily between the three suggested approaches OLS, municipality fixed effects and IV. 
This indicates that the basic OLS estimates are not severely biased, since the fixed effects 
analysis indicates that little bias is generated from unobserved attributes of the municipalities 
and the IV-procedure suggests that sorting between schools within the municipality does not 
seem to bias the estimates heavily either. The exception is the effect on English test scores, 
where the absolute value of the coefficient for poor buildings increase quite a lot when using 
IV compared to OLS or MFE.  
 
All in all, the results indicate that there may be some negative effects from poor school 
buildings on student achievements, but I can in most cases not conclude that the effects are 
significantly different from zero. Hence the results are similar to the results from the study by 
Hopland (2011) and Cellini et al. (2010). Hopland also found that there seems to be a negative 
relationship between poor school buildings and student achievements when studying data 
from the TIMSS. Similar to the present study, most of the coefficients in the TIMSS study are 
also insignificant. Cellini et al. unveiled a tendency that investments in school infrastructure 
lead to improvements in scholastic achievements in the long run, but similar to the results in 
this study, their results are not unambiguous. Thus it seems to be a consistent finding that 
there is a weak tendency towards that good school buildings give better student achievements 
in the countries that are studied in these papers.  
 
The low significance of the results in this paper may come from that the difference between 
the schools in the different building condition categories is simply too small for it to matter   17
for student achievements. In a wealthy country, such as Norway, one may have that minor 
issues concerning the building conditions are sufficient for a school to be reported as having 
poor buildings. Further, we have that a fairly low share of the students are enrolled in schools 
in one of the “extreme categories” (categories 0 and 3). This also points in the direction that 
the difference between school buildings reported to be in good or poor condition is not very 
large. Hence most students are enrolled in schools with buildings that are either, “quite good” 
(category 1) or “slightly poor” (category 2). It is possible that the differences between these 
are simply not severe enough to have any impact on the achievements.  
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper studies the effects from school building conditions on student achievements in 
Norwegian primary schools using data from national tests in mathematics, English and 
Norwegian, combined with survey data on school building conditions. The OLS estimates 
indicate some negative effects from poor school buildings on student achievements, but the 
estimates are mostly insignificant. Municipality fixed effects are used in order to control for 
unobservable characteristics on the municipality level. The estimates are similar to the OLS 
estimates, but the significance is somewhat lower. Finally, an instrumental variable approach 
is suggested in order to remove endogeneity due to sorting between schools within the 
municipality. The results from this approach are also mostly similar to the OLS estimates. The 
conclusion is that there seems to be some negative effects from poor school buildings on 
student achievements, but that the effects are mostly insignificant. This may be because the 
difference between the school buildings reported within the different building condition 
categories is simply not sufficiently large for them to affect student achievements in a rich 
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Table 1. The Building condition Index 
Category Interpretation  Frequency  (%) 
0  Flawless building   16 % 
1  Building in good working condition. Normal maintenance sufficient  31 % 
2  Building which needs some improvement exceeding normal 
maintenance 
42 % 
3  Building in deteriorated condition. Critical improvements needed  11 % 
    
  Poor buildings dummy   
Average 0.53   
(St.dev) (0.50)   
Obs 13,874   
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics. Test results 
 Mathematics Norwegian English 
Average score  26.10  19.86  22.56 
(St.dev) (9.13)  (6.66)  (8.16) 
Max/min 0/48  0/32  1/40 
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Table 3. Test of the link between non-reported schools in participating municipalities and 
student achievements. Municipality fixed effects. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES Math  Nor  Eng 
      
School is not reported  -0.357  -0.00219  0.0724 
 (0.230)  (0.152)  (0.257) 
Father’s  education  0.861*** 0.568*** 0.594*** 
 (0.0470)  (0.0359)  (0.0380) 
Mother’s  education  0.852*** 0.605*** 0.518*** 
 (0.0466)  (0.0322)  (0.0479) 
Father’s  income  8.57e-07*** 4.21e-07*** 5.51e-07*** 
 (2.21e-07)  (1.18e-07)  (1.47e-07) 
Mother’s  income  3.06e-06*** 1.23e-06*** 1.52e-06*** 
 (3.45e-07)  (2.43e-07)  (3.38e-07) 
First generation immigrant  -5.390***  -4.834***  -1.617*** 
 (0.433)  (0.367)  (0.399) 
Second generation immigrant  -2.638***  -2.739***  0.770* 
 (0.366)  (0.257)  (0.411) 
Number of students in school  -0.00140  -0.00111*  -0.00207** 
 (0.00137)  (0.000605)  (0.000971) 
Share of teachers with license  -2.926**  0.589  0.818 
 (1.458)  (0.881)  (1.387) 
Teacher/student ratio  -0.0496  -0.0131  -0.0341 
 (0.0461)  (0.0333)  (0.0451) 
      
Observations 22,100  21,651  22,058 
Number of knr  68  68  68 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
Constant term (not reported) included 
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Table 4. Summary statistics for the instrument, average school building condition in the 
municipality. 




Correlation with poor buildings dummy (n=13874)  0.54   iv
Table 5. Estimation of test results. OLS 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I)  (J)  (K)  (L) 
VARIABLES  Math Nor  Eng  Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng 
                  
Cat 1 (good working condition)  -0.274  -0.494  -0.632  0.0342  -0.387  -0.439  0.203  -0.336  -0.343  0.208  -0.311  -0.312 
 (0.583)  (0.327)  (0.465)  (0.516)  (0.265) (0.408)  (0.500)  (0.269) (0.399)  (0.427)  (0.231)  (0.339) 
Cat 2 (some improvement required)  -0.856  -0.742**  -1.178***  -0.411  -0.526**  -0.877**  -0.289  -0.493**  -0.796**  -0.209  -0.376*  -0.746** 
 (0.567)  (0.307)  (0.434)  (0.498)  (0.246) (0.378)  (0.482)  (0.249) (0.364)  (0.480)  (0.209)  (0.291) 
Cat 3 (critical improvements needed)  -0.761  -0.406  -0.929  -0.392  -0.204  -0.678  -0.270  -0.197  -0.551  -0.0504  -0.209  -0.562 
 (0.747)  (0.434)  (0.641)  (0.640)  (0.342) (0.582)  (0.638)  (0.343) (0.559)  (0.636)  (0.250)  (0.473) 
R-squared 0.001  0.001  0.003  0.114  0.100  0.054 0.118 0.102  0.059 0.122 0.104 0.063 
                  
                  
Poor  buildings  dummy  -0.653* -0.340  -0.701** -0.430 -0.198  -0.539* -0.421 -0.209  -0.518* -0.318 -0.133 -0.499* 
(= 1 if building is in Cat 2 or Cat 3)  (0.391)  (0.216)  (0.306)  (0.362)  (0.185)  (0.281)  (0.355)  (0.182)  (0.268)  (0.374)  (0.165)  (0.260) 
R-squared 0.001  0.001  0.002  0.114  0.100  0.054 0.118 0.101  0.059 0.122 0.103 0.063 
                  
Individual and family characteristics         +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
School characteristics              +  +  +  +  +  + 
Municipality  characteristics               +  +  + 
Observations  13,474 13,162  13,457  12,934 12,659  12,919 12,934 12,659  12,919 12,764  12,490 12,752 
Robust standard errors ((A)-(I): clustered on school level. (J)-(L): clustered on municipality level) in parentheses 
Constant term (not reported) included 
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Table 6. Estimation of test results. Municipality Fixed Effects included 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I) 
VARIABLES  Math Nor  Eng  Math  Nor  Eng  Math  Nor  Eng 
                 
                 
Poor buildings dummy  -0.479  -0.240  -0.553  -0.362  -0.167  -0.467  -0.385  -0.179  -0.485 
(= 1 if building is in Cat 2 or Cat 3)  (0.469)  (0.256)  (0.365)  (0.431)  (0.234)  (0.341)  (0.425)  (0.230)  (0.335) 
Individual and family characteristics        +  +  +  +  +  + 
School  characteristics            +  +  + 
Observations  13,474  13,162 13,457 12,934  12,659  12,919  12,934  12,659  12,919 
Number of municipalities  107  107 107 107  107  107  107  107  107 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Constant term (not reported) included 
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Table 7. IV regressions 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I)  (J)  (K)  (L) 
VARIABLES  Math  Nor Eng Math  Nor Eng Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng 
                   
Poor buildings dummy  -0.729 -0.553  -1.090  -0.365 -0.336  -0.779  -0.184 -0.378 -0.700 -0.233 -0.496  -1.304*** 
(= 1 if building is in Cat 2 or Cat 3)  (0.856) (0.567) (0.707)  (0.662) (0.363)  (0.531)  (0.682) (0.353) (0.502) (0.795) (0.399)  (0.464) 
Individual and family characteristics       +  +  + + + + + +  + 
School  characteristics            + + + + +  + 
Municipality characteristics                    +  +  + 
Observations  13,474  13,162  13,457 12,934  12,659  12,919 12,934 12,659 12,919 12,764 12,490  12,752 
First  stage-F  210  203 213 218  210  223 202 194 206 164 154  161 
Robust standard errors (clustered on municipality level) in parentheses 
County dummies and a constant term (not reported) included 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   I
Appendix. Appendix tables 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics, control variables. 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
     
Teacher/student ratio  13,874  10.42  2.47 
Number of students in school  13,874  326  147 
Share of teachers with license  13,874  0.83  0.09 
Combined school dummy  13,874  0.19  0.40 
Boy 13,874  0.50  0.50 
Father’s education  13,874  4.59  1.77 
Mother’s education  13,874  4.68  1.72 
Father’s income   13,351  473646  362740 
Mother’s income  13,649  256402  184242 
First generation immigrant  13,874  0.03  0.18 
Second generation immigrant  13,874  0.03  0.18 
Percentage of pop with univ. education  13,874  26  6.91 
Avg. gross income  13,874  343883  38526 
Effective number of parties in the local council  13,735  4.44  0.81 
Population growth (88-03, %)  13,742  11.53  10.21 
Local government revenue  13,742  96.70  10.01 
Funds   13,700  3.18  3.78 
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A2. Estimating the probability that the school was not reported. Linear probability model 
with municipality fixed effects. 
  
VARIABLES  Scool is not reported 
  
Father’s education  -0.000182 
 (0.00302) 
Mother’s education  -0.00589** 
 (0.00236) 
Father’s income  7.68e-09 
 (6.49e-09) 
Mother’s income  -1.04e-08 
 (1.63e-08) 
First generation immigrant  0.0244 
 (0.0279) 
Second generation immigrant  0.0497 
 (0.0444) 
Number of students in school  -0.000370** 
 (0.000168) 
Share of teachers with license  0.0757 
 (0.161) 




Number of knr  68 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Constant term (not reported) included 
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Table A3. Estimations of school building condition dummy. OLS. 
  (A) (C) (D) 






Average school building   0.465***  0.468***  0.433*** 
Condition (0.0317)  (0.0324)  (0.0337) 
Teacher/student ratio    -0.000168  0.00457 
   (0.0121)  (0.0126) 
Stud in school    -5.08e-05  -4.36e-05 
   (0.000271)  (0.000294) 
Teachers with     -0.352  -0.322 
license (share)    (0.308)  (0.303) 
Combined   0.0440  0.0374 
(1.-10. grade)    (0.0594)  (0.0629) 
Boy   0.00823  0.00784 
   (0.00707)  (0.00712) 
Father’s ed.    -0.00590**  -0.00449* 
   (0.00277)  (0.00246) 
Mother’s ed.    -0.00314  -0.00179 
   (0.00242)  (0.00228) 
Fathers inc.    -3.10e-09  6.63e-09 
   (1.21e-08)  (1.09e-08) 
Mother’s inc.    5.86e-09  1.69e-08 
   (1.67e-08)  (1.63e-08) 
First generation    0.0320  0.0289 
immigrant   (0.0273)  (0.0275) 
Second generation     0.0509  0.0506 
immigrant   (0.0396)  (0.0361) 
Percentage with university      0.000497 
education in the municipality      (0.00586) 
Avg. gross inc.      -3.26e-07 
     (1.27e-06) 
Effective number of parties      0.0819** 
     (0.0393) 
Population growth (88-03, %)      -0.00241 
     (0.00357) 
Local government revenue      -0.00484 
     (0.00304) 
Funds (% of revenues)      0.0141** 
     (0.00619) 
Share of socialists in the       0.471* 
local council      (0.280) 
Observations 13,874  13,289  13,116 
R-squared 0.319  0.327  0.344 
Robust standard errors (clustered on municipality level) in parentheses 
County dummies and a constant term (not reported) included 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  IV
Table A4. Estimation of test scores. Full regressions corresponding to upper part of Table 5 in main text. 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I)  (J)  (K)  (L) 
VARIABLES Math  Nor  Eng  Math  Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng 
                  
Category 1 (best buildings)   -0.274  -0.494  -0.632  0.0342  -0.387  -0.439  0.203  -0.336  -0.343  0.208  -0.311  -0.312 
  (0.583)  (0.327)  (0.465) (0.516)  (0.265)  (0.408) (0.500) (0.269) (0.399) (0.427) (0.231) (0.339) 
Category  2  -0.856  -0.742**  -1.178*** -0.411 -0.526**  -0.877**  -0.289  -0.493** -0.796**  -0.209  -0.376*  -0.746** 
  (0.567)  (0.307)  (0.434) (0.498)  (0.246)  (0.378) (0.482) (0.249) (0.364) (0.480) (0.209) (0.291) 
Category  3  (worst  buildings)  -0.761  -0.406 -0.929 -0.392  -0.204 -0.678  -0.270  -0.197  -0.551 -0.0504 -0.209  -0.562 
  (0.747)  (0.434)  (0.641) (0.640)  (0.342)  (0.582) (0.638) (0.343) (0.559) (0.636) (0.250) (0.473) 
Boy        1.878***  -1.197*** 0.101  1.871***  -1.199*** 0.0938 1.889***  -1.192*** 0.0974 
       (0.186)  (0.122)  (0.166)  (0.185)  (0.122) (0.165) (0.233) (0.123) (0.184) 
Father’s  ed.        0.888***  0.611***  0.615*** 0.867*** 0.605*** 0.595*** 0.868*** 0.590*** 0.579*** 
        (0.0556)  (0.0398)  (0.0514) (0.0548) (0.0399) (0.0510) (0.0616) (0.0437) (0.0536) 
Mother’s  ed.        0.870***  0.617***  0.508*** 0.868*** 0.618*** 0.504*** 0.883*** 0.610*** 0.509*** 
        (0.0613)  (0.0414)  (0.0526) (0.0618) (0.0413) (0.0524) (0.0585) (0.0345) (0.0484) 
Fathers  inc.        1.32e-06*** 5.64e-07*** 1.03e-06*** 1.26e-06*** 5.60e-07*** 9.93e-07*** 1.06e-06*** 4.94e-07*** 7.98e-07*** 
       (2.50e-07)  (1.47e-07)  (1.93e-07)  (2.46e-07)  (1.45e-07) (1.87e-07) (1.94e-07) (1.48e-07) (1.73e-07) 
Mother’s  inc.        2.97e-06*** 1.26e-06*** 1.94e-06*** 2.77e-06*** 1.22e-06*** 1.85e-06*** 2.55e-06*** 1.06e-06*** 1.64e-06*** 
       (4.57e-07)  (3.31e-07)  (3.96e-07)  (4.52e-07)  (3.22e-07) (3.83e-07) (3.75e-07) (2.75e-07) (3.75e-07) 
First  gen.        -4.369***  -4.297***  -1.589*** -4.457*** -4.328*** -1.626*** -4.695*** -4.381*** -1.755*** 
immigrant       (0.573)  (0.436)  (0.544)  (0.584) (0.437) (0.545) (0.646) (0.431) (0.584) 
Second generation         -2.196***  -2.436***  1.106**  -2.479***  -2.498***  0.915**  -2.649***  -2.589***  0.785* 
immigrant       (0.517)  (0.353)  (0.454)  (0.540) (0.367) (0.460) (0.545) (0.365) (0.407) 
Teacher/student  ratio              -0.00589  -0.0276 -0.0205 0.0538 -0.0125 0.0137 
              (0.0705) (0.0371) (0.0501) (0.0720) (0.0377) (0.0603) 
Stud in school              0.000828  -0.000579  -0.000222  -6.97e-05  -0.00136*  -0.000392 
              (0.00141) (0.000674) (0.00102)  (0.00152) (0.000721)  (0.000979) 
Teachers  with                -4.183**  -1.415 -1.925 -1.982 -0.775 -1.559 
license  (share)              (2.006) (0.975) (1.325) (2.038) (1.075) (1.389) 
Combined              -0.812*  -0.400 -1.261*** -0.608  -0.296 -1.264*** 
(1.-10.  grade)              (0.488) (0.279) (0.395) (0.539) (0.285) (0.402) 
Percentage  with  university                -0.0402  0.0296  -0.0163 
education in the municipality                 (0.0288)  (0.0196)  (0.0260) 
Avg.  gross  inc.                1.73e-05**  4.57e-06  1.97e-05*** 
                (6.64e-06)  (4.07e-06)  (6.40e-06) 
Effective  number  of  parties                -0.520*  -0.255*  0.301 
                (0.275)  (0.153)  (0.262) 
Population growth (88-03, %)                    0.00891  -0.00711  -0.0404** 
                (0.0246)  (0.0123)  (0.0194) 
Local  government  revenue                -0.0422**  -0.0184*  -0.0290** 
                (0.0185)  (0.00971)  (0.0132) 
Funds (% of revenues)                    0.0405  0.00975  0.0748** 
                (0.0553)  (0.0192)  (0.0293) 
Share of socialists in the local council                    -0.787  0.281  1.553 
                (2.258)  (1.078)  (1.573) 
Observations  13,474  13,162  13,457 12,934  12,659  12,919 12,934 12,659 12,919 12,764 12,490 12,752 
R-squared  0.001  0.001  0.003 0.114  0.100  0.054 0.118 0.102 0.059 0.122 0.104 0.063 
Robust standard errors (clustered on school or municipality level) in parentheses. Constant term (not reported) included *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   V
Table A5. Estimation of test scores. Full regressions corresponding to lower part of Table 5 in main text. 
  (A) (B) (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I)  (J)  (K)  (L) 
VARIABLES  Math  Nor  Eng  Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng 
                 
Poor buildings dummy  -0.653*  -0.340  -0.701** -0.430  -0.198 -0.539* -0.421  -0.209 -0.518* -0.318  -0.133 -0.499* 
(= 1 if building is in Cat 2 or Cat 3)  (0.391)  (0.216)  (0.306)  (0.362) (0.185) (0.281) (0.355) (0.182) (0.268) (0.374) (0.165) (0.260) 
Boy        1.877*** -1.192***  0.105  1.869*** -1.195***  0.0976  1.888*** -1.188***  0.100 
        (0.186) (0.122) (0.166) (0.185) (0.122) (0.165) (0.232) (0.123) (0.184) 
Father’s  ed.        0.888*** 0.613*** 0.616*** 0.867*** 0.606*** 0.595*** 0.868*** 0.590*** 0.578*** 
        (0.0555) (0.0399) (0.0515) (0.0548) (0.0400) (0.0511) (0.0615) (0.0438) (0.0536) 
Mother’s  ed.        0.870*** 0.618*** 0.508*** 0.868*** 0.618*** 0.505*** 0.883*** 0.610*** 0.509*** 
        (0.0614) (0.0416) (0.0528) (0.0620) (0.0415) (0.0527) (0.0584) (0.0344) (0.0483) 
Fathers  inc.        1.32e-06*** 5.70e-07*** 1.04e-06*** 1.26e-06*** 5.64e-07*** 9.98e-07*** 1.06e-06*** 4.95e-07*** 7.99e-07*** 
        (2.51e-07) (1.50e-07) (1.96e-07) (2.46e-07) (1.47e-07) (1.90e-07) (1.94e-07) (1.47e-07) (1.72e-07) 
Mother’s  inc.        2.96e-06*** 1.28e-06*** 1.97e-06*** 2.76e-06*** 1.23e-06*** 1.86e-06*** 2.54e-06*** 1.07e-06*** 1.64e-06*** 
        (4.57e-07) (3.30e-07) (3.99e-07) (4.51e-07) (3.22e-07) (3.85e-07) (3.73e-07) (2.75e-07) (3.77e-07) 
First  generation        -4.370*** -4.302*** -1.585*** -4.459*** -4.338*** -1.631*** -4.700*** -4.387*** -1.757*** 
immigrant        (0.572) (0.435) (0.543) (0.583) (0.436) (0.544) (0.645) (0.430) (0.577) 
Second generation         -2.198***  -2.414***  1.130**  -2.487***  -2.486***  0.926**  -2.653***  -2.584***  0.788* 
immigrant        (0.516) (0.353) (0.456) (0.538) (0.368) (0.462) (0.543) (0.371) (0.414) 
Teacher/student ratio              -0.00341 -0.0357  -0.0281  0.0546 -0.0185  0.00724 
              (0.0702) (0.0366) (0.0488) (0.0731) (0.0373) (0.0571) 
Stud in school              0.000808  -0.000636  -0.000274  -0.000106  -0.00144*  -0.000494 
              (0.00141) (0.000673) (0.00102)  (0.00156) (0.000731)  (0.000966) 
Teachers with               -4.134** -1.598*  -2.081  -1.973 -0.916 -1.700 
license  (share)              (2.011) (0.953) (1.303) (2.043) (1.030) (1.371) 
Combined              -0.809*  -0.377 -1.242*** -0.602  -0.269 -1.236*** 
(1.-10.  grade)              (0.485) (0.279) (0.393) (0.547) (0.287) (0.402) 
Percentage  with  university               -0.0390  0.0320*  -0.0139 
education in the municipality               (0.0286) (0.0191) (0.0259) 
Avg.  gross  inc.               1.72e-05***  4.60e-06  1.98e-05*** 
               (6.54e-06)  (4.09e-06)  (6.36e-06) 
Effective  number  of  parties               -0.523*  -0.253  0.306 
               (0.275)  (0.155)  (0.263) 
Population  growth  (88-03,  %)               0.00744  -0.00639  -0.0396** 
               (0.0246)  (0.0124)  (0.0194) 
Local  government  revenue               -0.0430**  -0.0180*  -0.0283** 
               (0.0186)  (0.0101)  (0.0136) 
Funds (% of revenues)                    0.0404  0.00894  0.0736** 
               (0.0556)  (0.0192)  (0.0295) 
Share of socialists in the local council                    -0.831  0.357  1.650 
               (2.268)  (1.076)  (1.561) 
Observations  13,474  13,162  13,457  12,934 12,659 12,919 12,934 12,659 12,919 12,764 12,490 12,752 
R-squared  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.114 0.100 0.054 0.118 0.101 0.059 0.122 0.103 0.063 
Robust standard errors (clustered on school level) in parentheses 
Constant term (not reported) included 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   VI
Table A6. Estimation of test results. Municipality Fixed Effects included. Full regressions, corresponding with Table 6 in main text. 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I) 
VARIABLES Math  Nor  Eng  Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng 
             
Poor buildings dummy  -0.479 -0.240 -0.553 -0.362 -0.167 -0.467 -0.385 -0.179 -0.485 
(= 1 if building is in Cat 2 or Cat 3)  (0.469) (0.256) (0.365) (0.431) (0.234) (0.341) (0.425) (0.230) (0.335) 
Boy      1.928***  -1.192***  0.120  1.925***  -1.194***  0.115 
        (0.233) (0.121) (0.186) (0.232) (0.121) (0.185) 
Father’s  ed.        0.891*** 0.609*** 0.612*** 0.890*** 0.606*** 0.602*** 
        (0.0612) (0.0443) (0.0528) (0.0620) (0.0442) (0.0527) 
Mother’s  ed.        0.866*** 0.605*** 0.499*** 0.866*** 0.605*** 0.497*** 
        (0.0571) (0.0341) (0.0483) (0.0577) (0.0345) (0.0484) 
Fathers  inc.      1.03e-06***  4.53e-07***  7.67e-07*** 1.04e-06*** 4.55e-07*** 7.65e-07*** 
        (1.86e-07) (1.44e-07) (1.73e-07) (1.85e-07) (1.43e-07) (1.68e-07) 
Mother’s  inc.      2.44e-06***  9.34e-07***  1.52e-06*** 2.45e-06*** 9.37e-07*** 1.54e-06*** 
        (3.85e-07) (2.73e-07) (3.81e-07) (3.84e-07) (2.72e-07) (3.78e-07) 
First  generation        -4.766*** -4.252*** -1.781*** -4.769*** -4.253*** -1.777*** 
immigrant        (0.638) (0.422) (0.573) (0.639) (0.424) (0.571) 
Second gen.         -2.779***  -2.558***  0.843*  -2.787***  -2.570***  0.809* 
immigrant        (0.516) (0.343) (0.453) (0.519) (0.343) (0.440) 
Teacher/student ratio              0.0429 -0.00441 0.0121 
            (0.0801)  (0.0415)  (0.0593) 
Stud in school              -3.80e-05  -2.51e-05  0.000502 
            (0.00170)  (0.000858)  (0.00108) 
Teachers  with              -0.705  -0.479  0.271 
license  (share)            (2.441)  (1.200)  (1.834) 
Combined            -0.157  -0.279  -1.178** 
(1.-10.  grade)            (0.519)  (0.326)  (0.460) 
Observations  13,474  13,162  13,457 12,934 12,659 12,919 12,934 12,659 12,919 
R-squared  0.000  0.000  0.001 0.107 0.091 0.045 0.107 0.091 0.047 
Number  of  knr  107  107  107 107 107 107 107 107 107 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Constant term (not reported) included 
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Table A7. IV regressions. Full regressions corresponding with Table 7 in main text. 
  (A) (B) (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I)  (J)  (K)  (L) 
VARIABLES  Math  Nor  Eng  Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng 
                 
Poor buildings dummy  -0.729  -0.553  -1.090  -0.365 -0.336 -0.779 -0.184 -0.378 -0.700 -0.233 -0.496  -1.304*** 
(= 1 if building is in Cat 2 or Cat 3)  (0.856)  (0.567)  (0.707)  (0.662) (0.363) (0.531) (0.682) (0.353) (0.502) (0.795) (0.399) (0.464) 
Boy        1.905*** -1.187***  0.119  1.897*** -1.186***  0.114  1.923*** -1.175***  0.129 
        (0.233) (0.122) (0.185) (0.231) (0.122) (0.184) (0.233) (0.122) (0.184) 
Father’s  ed.        0.871*** 0.609*** 0.600*** 0.865*** 0.609*** 0.592*** 0.865*** 0.594*** 0.582*** 
        (0.0592) (0.0404) (0.0510) (0.0592) (0.0405) (0.0508) (0.0614) (0.0437) (0.0519) 
Mother’s  ed.        0.882*** 0.619*** 0.518*** 0.880*** 0.620*** 0.515*** 0.883*** 0.610*** 0.511*** 
        (0.0566) (0.0330) (0.0481) (0.0569) (0.0336) (0.0477) (0.0572) (0.0340) (0.0481) 
Fathers  inc.        1.12e-06*** 5.24e-07*** 8.79e-07*** 1.12e-06*** 5.36e-07*** 8.79e-07*** 1.08e-06*** 4.94e-07*** 8.03e-07*** 
        (1.83e-07) (1.53e-07) (1.95e-07) (1.81e-07) (1.52e-07) (1.89e-07) (1.93e-07) (1.44e-07) (1.69e-07) 
Mother’s  inc.        2.55e-06*** 1.05e-06*** 1.64e-06*** 2.56e-06*** 1.07e-06*** 1.67e-06*** 2.54e-06*** 1.02e-06*** 1.58e-06*** 
        (3.86e-07) (2.82e-07) (3.71e-07) (3.79e-07) (2.79e-07) (3.69e-07) (3.69e-07) (2.71e-07) (3.79e-07) 
First  generation        -4.798*** -4.435*** -1.809*** -4.791*** -4.435*** -1.794*** -4.917*** -4.422*** -1.825*** 
immigrant        (0.611) (0.420) (0.570) (0.619) (0.420) (0.567) (0.614) (0.424) (0.567) 
Second generation         -2.628***  -2.609***  0.771*  -2.698***  -2.592***  0.722*  -2.681***  -2.599***  0.758* 
immigrant        (0.514) (0.366) (0.430) (0.541) (0.373) (0.432) (0.535) (0.369) (0.435) 
Teacher/student ratio             0.0889  -0.0179  0.0317  0.0975 0.00253 0.0437 
              (0.0687) (0.0327) (0.0512) (0.0712) (0.0378) (0.0524) 
Stud in school              0.000648  -0.000886  -0.000450  0.000406  -0.00109  -0.000130 
              (0.00126) (0.000567)  (0.000881) (0.00141) (0.000775)  (0.000966) 
Teachers with               -0.644 -0.104 0.332 -0.140 -0.264 -0.233 
license  (share)              (2.130) (1.036) (1.479) (2.115) (1.056) (1.432) 
Combined              -0.758*  -0.265 -1.113*** -0.656  -0.214 -1.164*** 
(1.-10.  grade)              (0.444) (0.277) (0.402) (0.474) (0.291) (0.417) 
Percentage  with  university               -0.0593  0.0176  -0.0338 
education               (0.0435)  (0.0233)  (0.0285) 
Avg.  gross  inc.               1.77e-05  6.22e-06  1.97e-05** 
               (1.12e-05)  (6.50e-06)  (9.23e-06) 
Effective  number  of  parties               0.185  0.195  0.989*** 
               (0.344)  (0.227)  (0.283) 
Population  growth  (88-03,  %)               0.00293  -0.0181  -0.0557*** 
               (0.0257)  (0.0138)  (0.0200) 
Local  government  revenue               -0.0187  -0.0231*  -0.0333* 
               (0.0232)  (0.0133)  (0.0172) 
Funds (% of revenues)                    0.0175  0.0253  0.0953*** 
               (0.0621)  (0.0256)  (0.0308) 
Share of socialists in the local council                    0.572  0.147  1.773 
               (1.877)  (1.165)  (1.394) 
Observations  13,474  13,162  13,457  12,934 12,659 12,919 12,934 12,659 12,919 12,764 12,490 12,752 
First stage-F  210  203  213  218 210 223 202 194 206 164 154 161 
Robust standard errors (clustered on municipality level) in parentheses. County dummies and a constant term (not reported) included 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   VIII
 
 
Table A8. Robustness test. IV-regressions with no geographical dummies and regional dummies 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I)  (J)  (K)  (L) 
VARIABLES  Math  Nor Eng Math  Nor Eng Math Nor  Eng Math Nor  Eng 
No geographical dummies                   
Poor buildings dummy  -0.641 -0.381  -1.142 -0.392  -0.283 -0.897 -0.144 -0.251 -0.729 0.355 -0.148 -0.639 
(= 1 if building is in Cat 2 or Cat 3)  (1.042) (0.547) (0.765)  (0.839) (0.331) (0.556)  (0.838) (0.311) (0.498) (0.883) (0.305)  (0.413) 
                   
Observations  13,474  13,162  13,457 12,934  12,659  12,919 12,934 12,659 12,919 12,764 12,490  12,752 
First stage-F  177  182  178 184  191  187 167 175 166 201 201  195 
                   
Regional  dummies                   
Poor buildings dummy  -0.982 -0.359 -1.138* -0.833 -0.328  -1.001** -0.596  -0.287 -0.826 -0.223 -0.197 -1.256** 
(= 1 if building is in Cat 2 or Cat 3)  (0.969) (0.666) (0.630)  (0.666) (0.485) (0.470)  (0.648) (0.480) (0.516) (0.925) (0.657)  (0.622) 
Individual and family characteristics        +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
School  characteristics            + + + + +  + 
Municipality  characteristics                +  + + 
Observations  13343  13031 13329 12808  12533 12796 12,808 12,533 12,796 12,764 12,490  12,752 
First stage-F  130  133  134 132  135  136 143 148 145 123 130  123 
Robust standard errors (clustered on municipality level) in parentheses 
Constant term (not reported) included 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 